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We reverse-engineer, test and analyse hardware and firmware of the commercial quantum-optical
random number generator Quantis from ID Quantique. We show that > 99% of its output data
originates in physically random processes: random timing of photon absorption in a semiconductor
material, and random growth of avalanche owing to impact ionisation. We have also found minor
non-random contributions from imperfections in detector electronics and an internal processing
algorithm. Our work shows that the design quality of a commercial quantum-optical randomness
source can be verified without cooperation of the manufacturer and without access to the engineering
documentation.
I. INTRODUCTION
Random number generators (RNGs) are used in a large
variety of applications. Nowadays both software and
physical RNGs are in use [1]. A crucial aspect of ran-
dom numbers is their unpredictability—the outcome of a
coin toss would not be considered random if it could be
known before the tossing. Software RNGs do not satisfy
this criterion (unless further assumptions are made) for
their output is generated by a deterministic algorithm,
which is why they are also termed “pseudo-random” [2].
Conversely, the output of physical RNGs is obtained by
measuring physical quantities. According to quantum
theory, for a suitably designed measurement on a quan-
tum system, the outcome cannot be predicted even if the
system’s physical state at the time when the measure-
ment process is started is known completely. Quantum
RNGs exploit such quantum measurements. Hence, if
designed properly, their outputs are fundamentally un-
predictable and, in this sense, truly random [3].
Although physical RNGs are used in commercial appli-
cations, as of yet there does not exist any complete and
reliable procedure for their certification [1]. Attempts to
establish requirements based exclusively on an analysis of
the output stream like NIST’s tests [4] are not sufficient
to ascertain randomness, because a statistical test of a se-
quence can never prove its unpredictability [5]. Indeed, a
device may pretend to generate randomness while actu-
ally replaying a bit sequence that has been prerecorded
from a true random source. The output of such a fake
RNG would then obviously pass any statistical test that
the true random source passes, whereas a third party
∗ m.petrov@rqc.ru
may hold an exact copy of the prerecorded sequence and
hence predict its output.
There are in principle two different approaches to re-
solve this problem. One is device-independent random
number generation [6–8]. Here the idea is to consider
data generated by two separated devices that share quan-
tum entanglement. The quantum origin of the data can
then be certified by a Bell test. The advantage of this
approach is that no assumptions about the inner work-
ings of the devices that produce the data are necessary.
However, with today’s technology, device-independent
schemes are complex lab experiments with impractically
low bit rates (see, e.g., [9]). In addition, they still need
some trusted randomness as input, which is used for se-
lecting between the different observables that enter the
Bell test.
In this work we are concerned with the converse, i.e.,
the device-dependent, approach [10]. In contrast to
the above, device-dependent RNGs are more practical,
smaller, faster, and cheaper [3]. The price to pay for this
is that, to certify their unpredictability, one requires an
accurate and verifiable model of the device’s operation,
described within the formalism of quantum theory. Such
a description is however rarely available for real-world
devices. In this case the assessment of the quality of the
generated randomness may still be based on tests of the
individual components of the device, but must usually
be supplemented by assumptions about the parts that
cannot be analysed completely.
Here we carry out such an analysis for the quantum-
optical “Quantis” device from ID Quantique [11], which
has been available since the year 2001 and used in a
number of real-world applications (Swiss Lottery, United
Kingdom NSI Banking, Ukraine Online Gaming, etc.
[11]). As explained above, the question whether the de-
vice generates true randomness cannot be answered by
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2mere statistical tests of the output sequence. Instead, a
user must trust that the randomness-generating process
the device’s manufacturer claims to employ has been im-
plemented correctly. To establish this trust, it should be
possible for an independent party to examine and ver-
ify the generator, including an in-depth inspection of its
internal functioning. This certification can be commis-
sioned by the manufacturer from an accredited certifica-
tion lab. ID Quantique has got verified the compliance
of Quantis with the AIS 20/31 standard [12, 13].
Typically, in the course of such a certification, the lab
examines design documentation provided by the man-
ufacturer, and examines a device sample according to
procedures defined in the standard. However, it is not
clear how well the procedures in the existing standards
cover the greater number of physical phenomena in the
quantum RNG. Also, reading the engineering documen-
tation in the first place may bias the testers and cause
them to overlook important differences between the ac-
tual design and the intended functioning as understood
and documented by the manufacturer. Therefore, here
we perform an independent examination of Quantis with-
out access to the manufacturer’s internal documentation.
The goal of our work is to identify the quantum processes
that produce data in Quantis, and verify that the internal
post-processing of this data is sound.
In analogue to existing practices in highly-demanding
hardware-dependent areas [14], [15], the certification pro-
cedure of the physical RNG should consists of at least the
following four stages.
• Discussion of the underlying physical model and
assumptions.
• Examination of calculation algorithms.
• Inspection of the hardware realization.
• Statistical tests of the output bit stream.
We follow the above methodology in our study. Previ-
ous studies have only tested the output stream of Quantis
[12, 16] but not analysed its internals.
We have examined 6 devices with different manufac-
turing dates, ranging from 2007 to 2013 with serial num-
bers (s/n): 0701100A210, 0701108A210, 0701132A210,
0902242A210, 1304527A210, and 1304609A210 (the first
two digits represent the year of manufacture and the re-
maining digits are internal serial numbers). Our key sam-
ple that provides most of our data has been purchased
from a regular stock, without warning the manufacturer
of its intended use. We have been guided only by openly
available information: a white paper [17], application
note [18], user guide [11], randomness test report [16],
and a patent that outlines the actual implementation of
the optics [19]. These sources provide a very basic under-
standing of the device’s principle and functionality. To
obtain the rest of the necessary data, we have reverse-
engineered the device, examining and analysing closely
its electrical and optical parts. During the examination
Clock
“Source of quantumness”
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Linear regulators
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FIG. 1. Main PCB, component side. SSC - step-up switch-
ing DC/DC converter, CPLD - complex programmable logic
device, Clock - system clock.
Quantis s/n 0902242A210 has been destroyed in order
to explore its optical part, obtain images of avalanche
photodiodes (APDs) and measure properties of the light
source. Our key sample (s/n 1304527A210) has been dis-
assembled but remained functional, and all our in-vivo
measurements have been done on it. The other four sam-
ples (s/n 1304609A210, 0701100A210, 0701108A210, and
0701132A210) have not been disassembled and have only
been used for tests of their output bit stream.
II. QUANTIS TEARDOWN
The basis of Quantis hardware is a printed circuit
board (PCB) that carries all its construction elements.
The board is coated with a thick layer of black epoxy
then packed into a metal can, presumably either to hide
the design or to protect internal components from am-
bient light and moisture. We have removed the can and
epoxy by heating the PCB up to about 150 ◦C with a
hot-air gun. At this temperature solder doesn’t yet melt
and electronic components survive, while the epoxy soft-
ens and can be peeled off completely. The PCB is shown
in Fig. 1.
A key part of the device is its “source of quantumness”,
consisting of a black anodized aluminum sleeve [Fig. 2(b)]
with a light source at one end [Fig. 2(a)] and a pair of
single-photon detectors at the opposite end [Fig. 2(c)].
No optical beamsplitter element has been found inside
the sleeve, which is consistent with the patent [19] but
disagrees with the optical scheme included in the specifi-
cation of the device that shows a free-space beamsplitter
(Fig. 1 in [17]).
The detectors are avalanche photodiodes (APDs)
working in a Geiger mode [20]. The all-silicon structure
embodies a pair of APDs, amplifiers and quenching cir-
3(a) (b) (c) (d)
10 mm 50 μm
FIG. 2. “Source of quantumness” taken apart. (a) Light
emitting diode (LED) light source. (b) Anodized aluminum
sleeve. (c) Pair of single-photon detectors. (d) Photosensi-
tive areas of the single-photon detectors (electron-microscope
image).
cuit for them. Geometric dimensions of the APDs have
been determined by electron microscopy: the sensitive
areas have a round shape with a diameter of ≈ 10 µm
spaced at 50 µm between their centers [Fig. 2(d)]. A pro-
grammable step-up switching DC/DC converter (SSC)
provides a bias voltage for both APDs.
We have measured spectral characteristics of the light
source. It has broadband emission centered at 820 nm
with full-width at half-magnitude (FWHM) of 40 nm,
and viewing angle of 10◦. These characteristics are very
typical for a near-infrared light-emitting diode (LED).
Linear voltage regulators with 3.3 and 1.8 V output
voltages (Fig. 1) power all on-board electronics. A broad-
spectrum 40 MHz oscillator provides a system clock. A
complex programmable logic device (CPLD) performs
most of the device functionality. This CPLD is Xilinx
type XC2C256 in a 100-pin package VQG100CMS1249
with multi-voltage input and output operation from 1.5
to 3.3 V. Unsurprisingly, the CPLD firmware is locked
against its readout. All the following knowledge has
therefore been obtained by analysing the rest of the elec-
tronic circuit, in-vivo signal capturing, applying external
probing signals and observing them propagating through
the circuit.
A simplified electrical scheme of Quantis and recorded
real signals are shown in Figs. 3 and 4. The RNG works in
a cycle-based regime. Every cycle starts with a 12 ns long
voltage pulse formed at line LD by the CPLD [Fig. 5(a)],
which is applied through a ballast resistor R to the LED
causing it to emit a longer flash of light [Fig. 5(b)]. This
light may trigger an avalanche in either of the APDs,
generating, after amplification, “click” signals DET1 and
DET2 for the CPLD. The CPLD operation procedure dif-
fers depending on whether or not clicks appear from the
APDs. If none of the detectors has clicked, the CPLD
just repeat next cycle by the pulse at line LD with a 50 ns
delay (cycles # 2, 3, 7–9, 12, 14, . . . in Fig. 4). If any of
the APDs clicks, the CPLD DETx input goes high and
it activates a quenching procedure by pulling the QNCH
output low, which reduces the bias voltage Vb on both
APDs and thus quenches the avalanche (cycles # 1, 4–6,
10, 11, 13, . . . ). In most cycles with detectors clicks (cy-
cles # 1, 4–6, 13, . . . ) the CPLD starts next cycle with
150 ns delay presumably needed to reduce afterpulsing
data_sck
data_out
LED
APD2
A1
A2
DET1
DET2
QNCH NOR XOR
PP
R LD
SCK
GEN
4 MHz
CNTi++
INT
SSC
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−Vb
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∫
APD chip
FIG. 3. Simplified electrical scheme of Quantis. A, amplifier;
APD, avalanche photodiode; CNT, counter; CPLD, complex
programmable logic device; GEN, clock generator; INT, inte-
grator; LED, light emitting diode; NOR, inverted OR gate;
PP, post-processing algorithm; R, resistor; SSC, switching
power supply; XOR, exclusive OR gate.
[20]. But sometimes one or both APDs click with a slight
delay relative to the LED light pulse (cycles # 10, 11,
20), in these cases the post-processing algorithm (PP in
Fig. 3) does not consider this to be a valid click and the
cycle time remains 50 ns.
To convert input APD clicks into the output random
bit stream, CPLD performs the post-processing proce-
dure. After post-processing the output binary stream of
the RNG is transmitted out through a serial peripheral
interface (SPI) bus: the random bit value should be read
on data out line at the leading edge of the clock signal
data sck [18].
An analysis of the captured oscillograms reveals the
following post-processing algorithm of converting APD
clicks into the output stream. A random bit is output
from PP if one and only one APD clicks (cycles # 1,
4–6, 13, 15, 19, 23–25, 28 in Fig. 4), namely the output
level data out may change and a sync pulse data sck is
generated. In cycles when none (# 2, 3, 7–9, 12, 14, 16–
18, 21, 22, 26, 29) or both (# 27) APDs click, and in
cycles with delayed (# 10, 11, 20) APD clicks, no output
random bit is produced (data out remains unchanged and
there is no sync pulse data sck).
The post-processing consist of a state machine (Fig. 6).
It has two states S = 0 and S = 1 and generates the
output bit xn (data out) in each CPLD cycle n . Only
one 1-bit internal variable exists: the value xn of the
last random bit outputted (0 or 1). Events A and B
correspond to valid clicks of the first (DET1) and the
second (DET2) APDs respectively. The state machine
works in every cycle as follows. When S = 0 and event
A occurs, a “flip” is executed—the output bit value is
reversed relative to the current one (xn+1 = xn) and the
state S remains unchanged. When S = 0 and event B
41 2 3 4
DET1
DET2
QNCH
LD
data_sck
data_out
Cycle # 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
150 ns
2221 23 24 25 26 27 28 29
50 ns
FIG. 4. Signals in the circuit, recorded during normal operation. Trace names correspond to signal names in Fig. 3.
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FIG. 5. Operation of the light source. (a) Voltage pulses
applied to the LED from the CPLD, via line LD. (b) Light
emitted by the LED.
flip:
xn+1 = xn
hold:
xn+1 = xn
S = 0 S = 1Start
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B
flip:
xn+1 = xn
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FIG. 6. Post-processing state machine.
occurs, a “hold” is executed—the value of the output bit
does not change (xn+1 = xn) and the state S changes to
the opposite (S becomes 1). When S = 1, at event A the
hold occurs and at event B the flip occurs. In the cases
when either none of the events A and B occur or both
events A and B occur simultaneously, S changes to the
opposite without outputting a bit. Note that PP treats
delayed clicks (# 10, 11, 20) as the absence of A and B.
Figure 4 shows signals in the circuit well after the state
machine has started. For the cycle we numbered #0 in
Fig. 4 we have S = 1, x0 = 0, and data out = 0.
A feedback loop exists to maintain a mean rate of the
output stream at the level of 4 MHz. For this purpose the
CPLD varies the bias voltage of the APDs Vb, effectively
tuning their quantum efficiency (Fig. 3). A counter CNT
measures a mean frequency of cycles when only one de-
tector clicks. The error signal of the feedback loop is a
difference between the value counted and the target rate
of 4 MHz. The error signal passes through a software in-
tegrator INT and is applied to the voltage control input
of the SSC.
III. ANALYSIS OF DESIGN
A. Physical model
We now have a closer look at Quantis’ underlying phys-
ical model, which we describe in terms of standard no-
tions from quantum optics. As we have investigated
before, the light source is a LED with central line at
λ = 820 nm and bandwidth of 2 ·∆λ = 40 nm. For such
a source the coherence time (a characteristic period of
time while light wave “remembers” its history) can be
estimated as
τcoh =
λ2
2pic ·∆λ ' 18 fs. (1)
On the other hand, the registration period of APDs sig-
5nals is at least 25 ns τcoh. Hence, the signal measured
can be regarded a result of a large number of possible in-
dependent photon absorption events. This would imply
that the APD clicks have Poissonian statistics and are
independent in both channels.
No entanglement by the number of photons may exist
in the current scheme: the presence or absence of a pho-
ton in one channel says nothing about signal in the other
one. It contradicts the principle declared in ID Quan-
tique Quantis white paper (p. 11) [17] that states it is a
“which way” scheme. It is not, because registration of a
photon in one channel doesn’t exclude the possibility of
photon registration in the other channel.
The actual physical source of randomness in Quantis is
the photoexcitation of a carrier in the absorption layer of
the APD [20]. A secondary significant source of random-
ness is the subsequent random growth of avalanche by
impact ionisation in the APD [21]. Owing to the statisti-
cal nature of the latter process, some avalanches die with-
out being detected (their number of carriers may fluctu-
ate down to zero), and for those detected their detection
time is randomly distributed. All these processes are by
their nature quantum and random.
B. Post-processing procedure
Now, let’s consider the post-processing algorithm with
assumptions that follow from the physical model. We
treat the signals from the pair of APDs as independent
Poisson processes with different probabilities of clicks
P(D1) ≡ p1, P(D2) ≡ p2. (2)
The probabilities of events when one and only one par-
ticular detector clicks (events A and B) are
P(A) = P
(
D1 •D2
)
= p1(1− p2) ≡ α,
P(B) = P
(
D2 •D1
)
= p2(1− p1) ≡ β (3)
and the probability that neither A nor B takes place is
P
(
A + B
)
= P
(
D1 ⊕D2
)
= 1− α− β. (4)
In this notation the probability that the next output bit
will be inverted with respect to the current bit (we call
this action a flip) equals to
P(flip) =α [α+ (1− α− β)β]
∞∑
m=0
(1− α− β)2m
+ β [β + (1− α− β)α]
∞∑
m=0
(1− α− β)2m
=
α2 + β2 + 2αβ(1− α− β)
1− (1− α− β)2 ,
(5)
while the probability of the next bit being equal to the
current bit (hold) is
P(hold) =α [β + (1− α− β)α]
∞∑
m=0
(1− α− β)2m
+ β [α+ (1− α− β)β]
∞∑
m=0
(1− α− β)2m
=
2αβ + (α2 + β2)(1− α− β)
1− (1− α− β)2 .
(6)
Their difference is thus
P(flip)− P(hold) = (α− β)
2
2− α− β
=
(p1 − p2)2
2− p1 − p2 + 2p1p2 ≥
(p1 − p2)2
2
.
(7)
For a real physical system, the count probability of two
detectors can never be perfectly equal, owing to differ-
ences in their quantum efficiency, size, intensity of il-
lumination, and possibly other factors. It follows from
Eq. (7) that if the probabilities of APD signals p1 and
p2 are not exactly equal, then the event flip will be more
likely than hold. This intrinsic property of the PP in-
troduces correlations in the output stream, i.e., makes it
less than perfectly random. We have studied this effect
experimentally in Sec. IV D.
The prevalence of the flip events may also be caused
by the APD signals being non-Poissonian, in particular
their exhibiting afterpulsing. We have not considered
this effect in our model.
C. Feedback loop stability
A feedback loop that maintains a constant bitrate of
the output stream includes integrator INT and switch-
ing power supply SSC (Fig. 3), besides other elements.
SSC has a passive filter network at its output with a
time constant of 100 ms. This means that its frequency
response decays by 20 dB per frequency decade at fre-
quencies > 1.6 Hz. The integrator provides an additional
slope of 20 dB per decade in the loop gain. Hence, the
phase margin is not sufficient, which may lead to peaking
and oscillation of the output stream bitrate.
Moreover, this feedback loop in theory allows that
a lock situation may happen. With increasing reverse
bias voltage Vb, the probability of APD clicks increases.
However, only single-detection events are counted. The
higher Vb is, the more simultaneous clicks in both de-
tectors appear and these events will be discarded. The
negative feedback may then turn into positive. This may
in principle lead to the system locking at the maximum
Vb.
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FIG. 7. APD dark count rate for the two APDs.
IV. MEASUREMENTS
In order to test the ability of RNG Quantis to gen-
erate random sequences, we have carried out a number
of measurements on both the source of randomness (the
APDs) and post-processing procedure. The objective of
each is to find and quantify possible non-random effects.
We compare the contribution of these in the output bit
stream with the specification of Quantis that states that
“thermal noise contribution” should be less than 1% [11],
which means to be the upper bound on all potential non-
randomness in the output stream. While we cannot claim
that our set of measurements is complete, the sum of the
non-random effects we have found does not exceed 1%.
A. Dark counts
Even in the absence of light, the APDs produce a cer-
tain number of clicks—dark counts [20]. Conservatively,
these are not considered to be the source of randomness.
We have measured the dark counts in 0 to 40 ◦C tem-
perature range, by placing Quantis in a thermal cham-
ber. Results of the measurements are shown in Fig. 7.
The dark count rate rises exponentially with tempera-
ture. Extrapolating to +70 ◦C, which it a commonly
assumed upper end of operating temperature range for
commercial products, we obtain less than 1 kHz dark
count rate summed over the two APDs. Thus the dark
counts contribute less than 0.025% of the output bits.
B. Autocorrelation of APD counts
In Quantis the sources forming a random output se-
quence are APDs. Therefore, we have first studied the
properties of the output signals obtained from photode-
tectors directly after their pre-amplification (DET1 and
DET2 in Fig. 3).
As discussed in Sec. III A, the clicks from each photode-
tector should be independent and their statistics should
be Poissonian. The measured autocorrelation function
under continuous-wave illumination from the LED is
a.
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FIG. 8. Autocorrelation of APD clicks under continuous-wave
illumination, for the two APDs (red and blue). (a) Plot on
the log scale. (b) Deviations of the measured data from an
exponential fit (or linear fit of the log plot). The measurement
time was 1000 s.
plotted in Fig. 8(a). It has an expected shape for a Pois-
sonian process, with a dip in the first 150 ns owing to
the deadtime imposed by the PP. However a close exam-
ination reveals small-amplitude oscillation of unknown
origin, which we have magnified in Fig. 8(b). The peak-
to-peak magnitude of these oscillations reaches 2.6%.
Owing to the relatively large magnitude exceeding 1%
and the oscillation frequency comparable with the output
bit rate, this effect is potentially significant. To analyse
it, the measurement needs to be repeated in the nor-
mal operation of the circuit (with gated LED). Also, a
cross-correlation on a similar or longer time scale need
to be measured and the combined correlation propagated
through the PP. Unfortunately, we have realised this after
dismantling the experiment. A simpler cross-correlation
measurement presented in Sec. IV C is insufficient for this
analysis.
C. Cross-correlation of APD counts
During an avalanche, the APD emits a few photons,
so-called backflash [22]. These may reach the other APD
(via internal reflections and scattering inside the optical
assembly) and cause a correlated click. Such clicks are
not considered to be random.
In order to estimate the click rate owing to the back-
flash, we have electrically disconnected the LED and
measured cross-correlation between DET1 and DET2
in darkness (Fig. 9). The peak owing to the optical
cross-talk is clearly visible. However, the probability of
backflash-induced click is small: in 16 h measurement
time, we have registered 2.8 × 106 single clicks in one
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FIG. 9. APD cross-talk, measured in darkness over 16 h.
Histogram bin size is 4 ns.
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FIG. 10. Cross-correlations of APD clicks under continuous-
wave illumination, measured over 3600 s. Histogram bin size
is 4 ns.
APD and 4.3× 106 in another, but only about 500 coin-
cidences in ±20 ns window. Thus the contribution of the
cross-talk to the output bit stream is ≈ 0.007%.
In order to check for possible further cross-talk effects,
we have repeated the measurement under continuous-
wave illumination from the LED. The result is shown in
Fig. 10. The central features are caused by the expected
circuit operation such as quenching (Sec. II). However
any cross-correlation beyond the shortest bit generation
interval of ±150 ns would be of interest, because it may
affect the output bit stream. Our histogram shows an el-
evated cross-correlation probability in −300 to −150 ns
range, however a further study is required to confirm it.
D. Statistical imperfections in the output bit
stream
To verify statistic bias owing to APD efficiency mis-
match derived in Sec. III B, a dedicated FPGA-based
circuit has been designed. It allows to analyse long con-
sistent sequences in real time without missing a bit. With
this setup, the sequence of signals of N = 1 Gibit length
at the output of the RNG has been analysed. The re-
sults of this analysis are given in Table I. We have mea-
sured five devices with different s/n. For each device,
we have counted the number of bits 0 and 1 in the out-
put stream N and calculated their relative deviation from
equiprobable. We have also counted the number of hold
and flip events, i.e., the number of two consecutive bits
having matching and not matching values. The last col-
umn shows the relative deviation of hold and flip from
equiprobable.
For a large and perfectly random binary sequence,
the standard deviation of the relative deviation from
equiprobable is N−1/2 ≈ 3.05 · 10−5. The relative de-
viation between the number of 0 and 1 bits in our tests is
small and does not exceed the standard deviation, with
the exception of the device s/n 0701132A210 that slightly
exceeds it. These results are in good agreement with the
expected equal probability of 0 and 1, i.e., the output se-
quence is balanced. However, for the hold and flip events
the situation is different. Their measured relative devi-
ation exceeds the standard deviation by a factor of 2 to
12. We infer that this statistical deviation is due to APD
efficiency mismatch.
Assuming click probabilities for both APDs are ap-
proximately equal p1 ≈ p2 ≈ 0.28 (estimated from the
recorded oscillograms in Fig. 4), we obtain from Eq. (7):
P(flip)− P(hold) ≈ (p1 − p2)
2
2− 2p1 + 2(p1)2 ≈
(p1 − p2)2
1.6
,
|p1 − p2| ≈
√
1.6 [P(flip)− P(hold)]. (8)
For Quantis s/n 0701132A210, in which the greatest devi-
ation has been observed, the absolute difference of APD
click probabilities |p1 − p2| ≈ 0.025 and the relative dif-
ference |p1 − p2|/p1 ≈ 8.8%. While this is a fairly good
click rate matching for the APDs manufactured on the
same chip, they are not identical.
We remark that the above statistically significant
prevalence of the flip bit pairs over hold bit pairs has
not been detected by the earlier statistical testing [16].
E. Feedback signal
We have measured time and frequency characteristics
of the feedback signal (Fig. 11). As expected, it exhibits
oscillations with the spectral maximum around 33 Hz.
These oscillations however should not affect the proba-
bility distribution of the output sequence, because they
affect both APDs in the same way. However, they should
cause the timing of the output bits to not be regular,
which indicates that the timing should not be used in an
application.
We have not observed the system locking, whose the-
oretical possibility is mentioned in Sec. III C.
V. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
While no optical beamsplitter element has been found
in the Quantis device, it nevertheless contains two sources
of randomness—two Geiger-mode APDs. Within them,
the relevant quantum processes are photoexcitation and
8TABLE I. Output stream statistics. Each sequence length N = 1 Gibit (≡ 230 bit).
Quantis s/n N(xn = 0) N(xn = 1) N(=1)−N(=0)N(=1)+N(=0) N(xn ⊕ xn+1 = 0) N(xn ⊕ xn+1 = 1) N(⊕=1)−N(⊕=0)N(⊕=1)+N(⊕=0)
0701100A210 536867999 536873825 5.4× 10−6 536828388 536913435 7.9× 10−5
0701108A210 536869215 536872609 3.2× 10−6 536839365 536902458 5.9× 10−5
0701132A210 536892157 536849667 −4.0× 10−5 536666863 537074960 3.8× 10−4
1304527A210 536882563 536859261 −2.2× 10−5 536787990 536953833 1.5× 10−4
1304609A210 536873035 536868789 −4.0× 10−6 536698339 537043484 3.2× 10−4
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FIG. 11. Control input signal of SSC, in (a) time domain and
(b) frequency domain.
impact ionisation. Basically, either APD may be re-
garded as an independent source of randomness, however
the presence of two of them increases the output bit rate.
To assess the quality of the randomness generated by
these APDs, one would in principle need a microscopic
model describing their workings. Within such a model,
one may then attempt to prove that their output is un-
predictable even if the quantum state of the APDs was
fully known (i.e., pure) at the time when the random-
ness generation process is initiated, that is, when the de-
vice received the trigger signal requesting it to generate
randomness [10]. However, lacking such a microscopic
model, one may also resort to physically reasonable as-
sumptions. Specifically, we assume here that the experi-
mentally measured behaviour of the APDs is identical to
the one they would exhibit if their microscopic degrees of
freedom were at the beginning of each measurement in a
pure state.
We have tested for potential imperfections in Quan-
tis that could have an impact on the randomness in the
output bit stream. We have found a correlation between
adjacent output bits owing to the click rate mismatch of
the APDs. However this and other effects stay well be-
low the specified “thermal noise contribution” of less than
1% [11], and could be eliminated by the use of random-
ness extractors [23]. Our preliminary conclusion is that
Quantis conforms to its published specification of the
physical randomness content in the output bit stream,
provided that one is ready to make the assumptions de-
scribed above.
Unfortunately, one potential effect that may lead to
an additional reduction of randomness—auto- and cross-
correlations of APD clicks—has not been sufficiently well
measured and analysed by us to reach a conclusion. This
could be the topic of a future study.
Overall, we have shown that an independent security
analysis of a commercial quantum RNG can be done.
This improves the trust in these devices.
We shared the finished manuscript with ID Quantique
before its submission for publication. The company read
it, thanked us, and did not suggest any significant cor-
rections.
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